Principles derived from recent studies have begun to converge and point to a 31 consensus for the neural basis of economic choice. These principles include the idea that 32 evaluation is limited to the option within the focus of attention and that we accept or 33 reject that option relative to the entire set of alternatives. Rejection leads attention to a 34 new option, although it can later switch back to a previously rejected one. The referent of 35 a value-coding neuron is dynamically determined by attention and not stably by labeled 36 lines. Comparison results not from explicit competition between discrete representations, 37 but from value-dependent changes in responsiveness. Consequently, comparison can 38 occur within a single pool of neurons rather than by competition between two or more 39 neuronal populations. Comparison may nonetheless occur at multiple levels (including 40 premotor levels) simultaneously through a distributed consensus. This framework 41 suggests a solution to a set of otherwise unresolved neuronal binding problems that result 42 from the need to link options to values, comparisons to actions, and choices to outcomes. 43 44 3 45
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direction per se, that determines which option is evaluated. The underlying foraging 142 models that support these ideas have also proven quite useful in explaining a great deal of 143 brain activity (Kolling et al., 2012; Kolling et al., 2014; Hayden, 2017; Blanchard and 144 Hayden, 2014; Boorman et al., 2011 , Boorman, et al., 2013 , Boorman et al., 2009 . 145
Implications for the framework: If we can only attend one offer at a time, then 146 processing of the two offers in a binary choice must occur serially, not in parallel ( Figure  147 2). (The same is true for choices with more than two offers, see below). Relative to 148 parallel models, serial processing poses a new problem and solves an old one. The new 149 problem is that it requires a working memory buffer so that the value of a previously 150 attended option can be maintained in order for any comparison to occur. The solved 151 problem is the option-value binding problem. Because attention is limited to one option, 152
there is no ambiguity about the reference of value-related neural responses. As long as 153 the decoder knows where the focus of attention is, the referent of the value signal is 154 unambiguous (that focus need not be spatial; it may be abstract and conceptual.) 155 156 157 2. We decide whether to accept or reject that option 158
If only one option is attended at a time, it is natural that the decision will be 159 simply to accept or reject that one. Rejection would be favored, even for very good 160 options, when the cost of inspecting the next one is low and there is no cost to returning 161 to the first one (as in most laboratory binary choice tasks, although not necessarily as in 162 natural contexts). In the laboratory, then, we would therefore expect a period of 163 inspection before a period of choice. As noted, foraging theory has long emphasized the 164 idea that preys are naturally encountered alone, and thus our brain's evolved choice 165 strategy is to either accept or reject a single offer (Stephens and Krebs, 1986; Charnov, 166 1976 ; Krebs et al., 1977) . This decision is made relative to an estimate of the value of 167 rejection (i.e. the opportunity cost of accepting), known as the background value. 168
From this accept-reject perspective, ostensibly binary choices involve two largely 169 distinct accept-reject decisions, one for each offer (Kacelnik et al., 2011) . These two 170 decisions may be implemented by separate, possibly interacting, diffusion-to-bound 171 processes. These ideas are somewhat well-supported by reaction time data (Freidin et al., 172 given special status: default (the currently attended one) and alternative (the other one). A 174 good deal of evidence supports the idea that cortical choice processes adopt this framing 175 (Kolling et al., 2012; Boorman et al., 2009; Boorman et al., 2013; Kolling et al., 2014; 176 Azab and Hayden, 2017) . 177
Implications for the framework: If we attend single offers in turn and accept or 178 reject each one, direct comparison of values per se need not occur (Kacelnik et al., 2011) . 179
Comparison may instead result indirectly from the fact that we cannot choose both 180 options if both options are favored for an 'accept' decision. A form of value comparison 181 may sneak in via the accept-reject process if the accept-reject decision is made relative to 182 the background, and the background consists of the other option (or best of others in the 183 case of more-than-two-option choice). As a consequence, we do not need separate pools 184 of neurons for representing the two offers, nor do we need additional neurons to perform 185 the comparison (Figure 1) . Getting rid of comparator neurons avoids the difficult binding 186 problem by which the offer-selective neurons are dynamically configured to converge on 187 specific comparator neurons. One advantage of using a single pool is that the brain can 188 use all its resources to the difficult problem of value estimation, which requires sensory 189 information, memory and prospection, rather than using anatomically separate 190 computational resources for every option that is (or even that can be) available. The 191 disadvantage, of course, is that the serial nature of value estimation can slow down the 192 decision-making process and requires memory. alignment is not a novel idea, but rather the same basic principle by which feature coding 230 in the ventral stream works (Desimone and Duncan, 1995) . 231
Implications for the framework: If value coding is attentionally aligned, then the 232 framework can have a set of value-sensitive units that are ignorant of the details of the 233 input stimuli. Specific value-sensitive units in the network have an organizational 234 advantage: they will not need to be precisely wired with offer layer neurons. This 235 arrangement gives the system much more flexibility to deal with rapidly changing 236 options, new options, and more than two options. One disadvantage is that if an ensemble 237 of attentionally aligned neurons uses the same format to encode the value of two different 238 options, a decoder cannot know, without some additional information (specifically, which 239 option is attended), to which option a neuron firing rate refers. By contrast, in a labeled 240 line coding system, there is no ambiguity about which option a neuron's firing rate 241 indicates: after all, the line is labeled. On the other hand, if the decoder knows the status 242 of attention, then the referent of the neuron's firing rate is unambiguous. Thus, the 243 option-value binding problem can be solved without need for any supervisory system 244 other than the one that controls attention. Wallis, 2016) . In other words, the brain may use only one pool of neurons to encode the 264 two different values at different times, not two separate ones. At least one study indicates 265 that some of these regions use a single pool of neurons to encode offered and chosen 266 values as well (Blanchard et al., 2016) . 267
A simple test for separate populations is to compare unsigned regression 268 coefficients (this is similar to, but more statistically sensitive than, performing a Venn 269 method uses Bayesian statistics to ask whether the tuning functions for the two variables 273 supports a single or dual clusters (Blanchard et al., 2016) . This method rejects any 274 option-specific clustering 4 brain regions (VS, vmPFC, OFC, and dACC). It also rejects 275 clustering for offer and chosen values. 276
Note that the case here is not definitive; there is a good deal of ostensibly 277 contradictory empirical support for two pools, and several papers for data consistent with 278 a two pool model (Padoa-Schioppa, 2011) The question of how many pools there are is 279 difficult to answer because the brain may in principle divide up the two offers in any of a 280 number of ways, perhaps arbitrarily and perhaps randomly from trial to trial. Methods 281 that average across multiple trials may then therefore average across the two pools 282 making two look like one. Our analyses so far suggest that neurons do not consistently 283 align to the first/second offer or the left/right offer in asynchronous left-right choices 284 (Azab and Hayden, 2017; Blanchard et al., 2017; Blanchard et al., 2015) . Perhaps the 285 strongest evidence so far comes from datasets with simultaneously recorded cells, 286 1 2 allowing robust single trial analysis, which still fail to indicate separate pools of cells 287 (Rich and Wallis, 2016) . 288
Implications for the framework: The one-pool finding, if true, goes hand in glove 289 with the attentional alignment hypothesis. Specifically, if there is a single pool of 290 neurons, its firing rates must somehow be linked with an option. The most 291 straightforward way would be to limit reference to a single possible option, defined by 292 attention. That system would allow the set of neurons to flexibly encode the value of any 293 offer, and would free the system from having to have a rigid linkage for offers and 294 values. The narrow restriction of attention to a single option would thereby resolve the 295 option-value binding problem. This logic also works for the tentative finding that offered 296
and chosen values are encoded by the same neurons: presumably the chosen offer is 297 attended around and immediately after the time it is chosen, and so it should be encoded 298 in the same neurons that encoded its value at offer time. 299 300 . When the action is clear and overt, that action plan is called an affordance (Cisek, 353 2007) . We use the more generic term action plan here to mean pretty much the same 354 thing as affordance, but to include contexts in which the action plan is not clear (imagine 355 for example you are asked which entrée you wish to order, but there is no menu to point 356 at). As evidence accumulates in favor of one option, its corresponding action plan gets 357 stronger and the other one gets weaker, until the decision threshold is reached (Cisek and 358 Kalaska, 2005; Cisek, 2006) . The intensity of a given action plan is positively correlated 359 with its value relative to the other one (Pastor-Bernier 2011; Cisek, 2012). The gradual 360 evolution of these processes, in turn, gives rise to decisional commitment (Thura and  361 Cisek, 2014). Together, these findings support a biased competition model for economic 1 5 choice, which extends classic ideas of biased competition from the perceptual system to 363 the motor system (Cisek, 2005;  Cisek and Kalaska, 2010; Pastor-Bernier 2011). 364
Implications for the framework: These results suggest that attending to one offer 365 will activate its action plan and that switching to the other will suppress its action plan 366 and enhance the other's. During deliberation, these modulations will not trigger an action, 367 but they will be critical for the process of selection and commitment that occur when 368 deliberation ends. These findings also raise the possibility of a solution to the action 369 binding problem as well: if the attended offer activates its corresponding representation in 370 the premotor system, then there is no ambiguity about which option that action code 371 corresponds to. The recent empirical findings provide important new constraints for any proposed 380 mechanisms for the neural basis of choice. These constraints, in turn, point towards the 381 following general framework, which accounts for the major threads of data described 382 above. The goal of this review is to sketch out this framework. We do not pretend the 383 framework is complete. It will need to be developed and revised with new, more detailed 384 exploration and data. 385
We assume that the brain's decision-making system can be thought of in the 386 following manner ( The variable could be any variable or set of variables that correlates with choosing the 396 attended option, such as "evidence in favor," or signals that reflect the values of 397 individual object features). 398
The activation of the offer layer will also activate the option's action plan in a 399 premotor layer. The action plan is the specific action that would be used to select the 400 option, and can be as specific as a reach or as abstract as the concept of "select this option 401 using the appropriate action when that action is later identified." The premotor units get 402 signals from both the offer and the value layer. The option information activates the 403 associated action; the value information activates all output actions non-specifically 404 (arrows are not displayed but they are understood as present), providing a general drive to 405 act. The interaction between the value units and the offer units allows for only the 406 attended action to be selected. Finally, the framework allows for additional non-specific 1 7 modulatory inputs to all action units, which lets extraneous factors such as urgency to 408 affect the likelihood that an action will be triggered (not shown). 409
Within the context of a choice task, units in the value layer take on the property of 410 response-dependent suppression (although this property can in principle be in other 411 layers of the circuit, meaning its response to the first attended offer attenuates its 412 response to the second one in proportion to its response to the first (or a function thereof, 413 more generally). Suppression is not necessary per se, as response-dependent enhancement 414 or any other time of temporal dependence of past responses could certainly work as well. 415
However, response-dependent suppression is a prominent feature of the inferotemporal 416 cortex (IT, e.g. Miller 1991) and may be observed in the reward system as well (e.g. 417 Barron et al., 2013) and dependence on previous outcomes is commonly observed in the 418 reward system (e.g. Kennerley et al., 2011; , reasons for which we 419 favor that neuronal implementation of our framework . This response-dependent 420 suppression will serve the purpose of a within-cell memory (i.e. doesn't require an 421 additional external memory buffer and thus can occur within one pool) that will produce 422 value comparisons. There are many possible neuronal mechanisms that could implement 423 response-dependent suppression; we use a simple one for concreteness, one for which 424 there is ample evidence in different domains and thus can be a computational motive: 425 divisive normalization (Carandini and Heeger, 2012; Reynolds and Heeger, 2009) . 426
Note that the idea of repetition suppression, regardless of its specific neuronal 427 implementation, makes a specific novel prediction in asynchronous choice contexts: that 428 regression weights for the second offer computed in the second epoch will be reduced 429 relative to regression weights for the first offer computed in the first epoch. would need to be revised in the future, at least there is some compelling evidence in its 439 support and concedes further exploration of its implications. 440 441 First fixation: value and action plan for first option 442
Given this general description of the framework, we next walk through the steps 443 of choice. We propose that in practice, consideration of options is nearly always 444 asynchronous. That is, even when multiple options are presented simultaneously, 445 attention selects one of them for scrutiny first, possibly covertly (Krajbich et al., 2010) . 446
When the first offer is attended, the units responsive to its features and/or identity in the 447 offer (feature) layer are activated; these units proceed to activate corresponding value and 448 action units. The action will not yet be triggered. In most cases, assuming the need to 449 decide is not extremely urgent, the first option is likely to be automatically rejected in 450 order to consider the second option; this would be implemented by the global modulatory 451 inputs. Specifically, we can say it would be rejected because the background benefit-cost 452 ratio is quite high: it includes the informational value of the second offer at the very low 453 time and energetic costs of simply looking at it. 
460
Those are the units that, if the action they signal is released, the animal will choose the 461 offer. When the second offer appears, its feature detectors are excited. They active the 462 appropriate value units, which are likely the same ones that were activated by the first 463 offer, and with the same tuning function. They also activate their appropriate premotor When attention shifts to the second offer, its corresponding offer-layer units will 470 be activated. These units then activate the corresponding value-layer units -which will 471 be the same ones that signaled the value of the first offer; they will also use the same 472 format to do so (e.g. a unit with positive tuning for offer 1 will have positive tuning for 473 offer 2). However, when the second offer is processed, the value-layer units will continue 474 to show response-dependent suppression for the value of the first offer. If the first offer 475 was particularly good, the response to even a good second offer will be attenuated. If the 476 first offer was poor, the response to the second will be less attenuated. The value-coding 477 units will therefore exhibit simultaneous and anti-correlated tuning for the values of both 478 offers (as in Strait et al., 2014) . Notably, the value of the second offer will not be encoded 479 per se. It will only ever be encoded relative to the value of the first. The second offer will 480 also lead directly to the activation of its action plan, just as the first offer did. The action 481 plan for offer 2 will be more strongly activated than the one for offer 1, because attention 482 enhances the action plan. However, we anticipate the action plan for offer 1 will be 483 moderately activated, due to system hysteresis. Both action plans will therefore be 484 activated simultaneously (as in Cisek et al., 2005) . 485
Subsequent to the second fixation, subjects may select it or they may return to the 486 first offer. A return to the first offer will lead the value-layer units to encode its value 487 relative to the value of the second. (This hypothesis has not yet been tested, but follows 488 naturally from our framework). Its action plan will be also be enhanced. This process can 489 continue back and forth until an option is selected (as in Rich and Wallis, 2016) . Why 490 would a decision-maker come back a second time rather than just decide immediately? 491
We hypothesize that additional bouts of consideration provide a more accurate estimate 492 of the value of the offers to due accumulated response-suppression of the value unit, 493 allowing for fine discrimination of closely valued options. 494 495
Choice and outcome periods: relative value and action plan of chosen option 496
An option is selected when the activation in the action layer crosses some 497 threshold. The threshold is determined by several factors that combine to determine the 498 2 1 value of rejection. There is very little data on the process of threshold computation (but 499 see Kolling et al., 2014) . However, we assume that rejection has a high value following 500 the first offer (because of the informational benefit and low cost of inspecting the second 501 one.) The value of rejection will decrease as time increases and the opportunity cost of 502 further deliberation rises. Once one action plan crosses a threshold, commitment occurs 503 and the selected action inhibits other activated actions, so as to ensure only one action 504 plan is implemented (Thura and Cisek, 14 .) The selection process leads the chosen option 505 into the focus of attention. As such, its offer units are preferentially activated and value-506 layer units encode its value. Note that there are no chosen value units; the units encoding 507 the chosen value are the same value-selective units that were involved in choice. 508 509
After selection 510
After selection, the reward is received, the chosen option will be attended, and its 511 corresponding offer, value, and action units will be correspondingly activated (or 512 reactivated). In addition, post-reward processes will come into play. These post-reward 513 processes include monitoring, learning, adjustment, and updating of priors, as well as 514 possibly switching to new strategies or rules. These processes are unique to the post-515 reward period, and will therefore create patterns that are not observed in the offer period, 516 but that will be superimposed on the standard offer-related signals (Wang and Hayden, 517 2017; Nogueira et al, Nat Comm, 2017). 518
519
Extending the framework to more than two options 520
Our framework deals well with binary choices, but they need an additional feature 521 to handle choices with more than two options (which we call multi-option choices for 522 convenience). Our model here will be more speculative since we do not have unit data 523 option, the brain encodes its value relative to the value of the best of the first two options 527 (Boorman et al., 2013) . The brain could maintain a separate buffer to store the value of 528 2 2 the best-so-far option, but we propose a simpler alternative with a single unlabeled value 529 buffer. 530
Specifically, we propose that the brain maintains an active salience buffer -a 531 representation of the entire option space (both the visual scene and some abstract set of 532 options could be included). The buffer tracks the location of the most valued option so far 533 -but not its value, nor its identity or action plan. The computational framework described 534 above can also be extended to account for multi-option choices using the idea of the 535 salience buffer. The basic idea is that only the offer with the highest value so far is 536 actively remembered, causing divisive normalization on the current stimulus being 537 attended (cf. Louie et al., 2011) . Finally, based on the current response, a choice needs to 538 be made between the new stimulus and the past stimulus with the highest value. This 539 pairwise comparison can be made in the same way as described in the previous section. 540
541
A possible neuronal implementation 542
The key element of our computational model is the presence of a memory 543 mechanism that affects the response of the value layer to the second option and depends 544 on the value of the first option. We propose that this computation is implemented by 545 repetition suppression, via divisive normalization (Carandini and Heeger, 2012; Reynolds 546 and Heeger, 2009). Note that repetition suppression per se is not necessary; similar 547 effects can be obtained if neurons exhibit repetition enhancement. We focus here on 548 repetition suppression because it is strongly supported empirically (e.g., firing rate 549 adaptation). 550
We assume that the attended option encoded in the offer layer delivers 551 information to the value-encoding layer (see Figure 7) . In response to the first offer, with 552 value ܸ ଵ , the firing rate of neuron
where ߙ is a positive coefficient. We consider for simplicity only positive values, 556 although this framework can be naturally extended to negative values too, and to any 557 arbitrary form of tuning curves (e.g., non-linear). 558
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When the second offer appears, the response of the value-encoding neurons will 559 be diminished because of repetition suppression in the value (or even in the offer) layer. 560
We assume here that repetition suppression in the value layer is caused by divisive 561 normalization of the neuronal response to the second option in proportion to the strength 562 of the first response. Specifically, the response of neuron neurons are heterogeneous and the population is sufficiently large, as we will see in a 582 neuronal implementation of this basic algorithm (see Figure 8 ). This is because if the 583 divisive normalization parameter approximately linear functions, it is possible to compute the value difference, which is 586 again a linear function. Therefore, a layer of value neurons with repetition suppression 587 has all necessary information to perform a sequential comparison of two offers, and this 588 information can be extracted by a simple linear readout. 589
What kind of signals in the brain could carry information from the past to the 590 present in a format that allows also comparing values of sequentially attended stimuli? 591
One such potential candidate is synaptic depression (Tsodyks and Markram, 1997; 592 Abbott, 1997) . Synaptic depression acts on the inputs to a neuronal population in such a 593 way that continuous stimulation causes synaptic resources, such as number of vesicles 594 and amount of neurotransmitter, to be depleted. Due to its slow decay, depressing 595 synapses can hold information in working memory for several seconds (Mongillo et al., 596 2008; Miller and Desimone, 1994; Miller et al., 1991) . Thus, synaptic depression is a 597 potential mechanism for facilitating the comparison between the values of two offers 598 presented asynchronously through repetition suppression. It is possible that there are 599 multiple mechanisms with similar effects working together, for instance, firing rate 600 adaptation in the offer and value layers. Here we show simply that synaptic depression is 601 a good starting point, although we acknowledge that, due to its rigidity in the slow time 602 scales involved, it will insufficient to accommodate the large variations of timing in 603 which decision making can occur. This proposal then should be seen as a workable 604 example of how these changes may occur, illustrating the viability of our framework. 605
We consider a value layer comprised of N independent neurons described by their 606 temporally modulated averaged firing rate, is the 613 synaptic depression variable for the inputs for neuron i, with takes lower values the 614 higher the activity was in the recent past. Therefore, the net input into each neuron is not 615 simply the external current, but a normalized version of it with a normalization factor that 616 2 5 depends on the previous history of attended options and their values. Further details for 617 the models are described in the Methods section. The dynamics of a neuron in the value 618 layer is shown in Figure 7 for three relevant scenarios. The external input to the neuron 619 is shown in the top panel, while the response and the synaptic depression variables are 620
shown in the middle and bottom panels respectively. 621
In the first scenario (tuning to EV1-EV2; Figure 7A) This can be understood by looking at the temporal evolution of synaptic 631 depression variable. Initially, this variable has a relatively large value due to low 632 spontaneous firing rate (around one half). However, during attention to the first option, 633 the external input increases and as a consequence the depression variable decays to a 634 lower value (blue, lower panel). Right after offer offset, the depression variable starts to 635 recover and increase towards the basal value. However, the increase is slow due to the 636 long recovery time constant of synaptic resources, and thus the depression variable does 637 not have time to reach the basal value. Indeed, when the second offer is attended, the 638 depression variable has a value that is lower than the basal value. This difference leads to 639 a response to the second offer that depends on the value of the first offer. 
Decoding choices 675
We next asked whether a downstream decoder can make an accurate choice based 676 on the activity of the neurons in the value layer during the second offer epoch. As noted, 677 the response to the second attended option is inverted relative to the first. This inverted 678 tuning allows the system to compare the values. How can this information be extracted? 679
As with the computational framework, it is not possible to read out this information if 680 only one type of neuron is present in the value layer. This is because the firing rate of a 681 neuron during the second epoch depends on the values of both first and second attended 682 offers and does not necessarily compute a value difference between the two. Our strategy 683 is then to create a heterogeneous population of neurons in the value layer, which is a 684 realistic feature throughout the brain architecture. Heterogeneity can be introduced by 685 choosing neuron and depression parameters randomly (Methods). 686
With a value layer consisting of just four neurons, it is possible to estimate the 687 value difference approximately (Figure 8 , blue points; max error = 0.97). With ten 688 neurons, it is possible to estimate value difference with high precision (Figure 8 Here we review recent discoveries about the neuronal correlates of economic 711 choices and propose a novel guiding framework for future models of how that choice 712 occurs. In this framework, only one option is attended at a time and processing of that 713 option leads to either acceptance or rejection. Rejection often leads to consideration (and 714 sometimes choice) of the next option. During deliberation, attention to an option activates 715 a representation of its value and of the action plan associated with choosing it. This action 716 plan can be specific or it can be abstract, that is, it can in principle be a commitment to a 717 proposition (Shadlen and Kiani, 2013) . Our framework requires a single pool of value-718 sensitive units whose responses encode the value of the attended option relative to the 719 value of previously attended options. It does not involve two pools or more of cells that 720 use labeled-line coding and that compete for control of action. Comparison is 721 accomplished through a value normalization process that can occur simultaneously at 722 multiple levels and that may involve a response-dependent suppression of future 723 responding. As such the evaluation, comparison and the selection are made by the same 724 pool of neurons. 725
The proposal is not meant to be a formal model for choice, but is, rather, to be a 726 general framework that can guide the development of such models in the future. One 727 particular limitation of the framework is that it does not correspond to the unit level. For 728 example, the strict division into an offer layer, a value layer, and an action layer is not 729 supported by current data. Instead, individual cells are likely to have multiple 730 contributions in multiple layers simultaneously. These functions may even change and 731 adjust with task context (e.g. Hunt et al., 2013) . Another example is that value-sensitive 732 neurons, such as those in orbitofrontal cortex may be stimulus-specific, and thus not 733 directly analogous to our value layer (e.g. Schoenbaum et al, 1998) . A third example of a 734 limitation of our framework is that value comparison is likely to occur not within a single 735 region, but rather through a distributed consensus process that includes ostensibly motor 736 and association regions both (Cisek, 2012 ; Chen and Stuphorn, 2016; Hunt and Hayden, 737 2017) . Ultimately, we propose that our framework may be a description of the 738 algorithmic level, but not the implementation level, of choice. 739 3 0 740 Relation to models of sensory memory-guided decisions. Our framework is 741 partially inspired by well-known models of memory-guided perceptual decisions (Miller, 742 et al., 1991; Miller and Desimone, 1993; Lui and Pasternak, 2011; Hayden and Gallant, 743 2013; Mirabella et al., 2007; Machens et al., 2005; Romo et al., 2002; Romo and Salinas, 744 2001; Romo and Salinas, 2003) . Typically in memory-guided perceptual decisions, a 745 memorandum is presented to the subject followed by a delay and then a probe. The 746 subject is then asked to perform a perceptual discrimination on the relationship between 747 the memorandum and the probe (e.g., do they match? Which has higher frequency?). One 748 approach to modeling these decisions is to allow the memorandum to modify the sensory 749 tuning properties of neurons so that their response to the probe makes the correct 750 classification automatically (Miller et al., 1991 , Machens et al., 2005 . This general 751 approach has been successful in modeling mid/high-level and prefrontal responses (with 752 visual memoranda) and prefrontal responses (with somatosensory memoranda.) Indeed, 753 we propose that binary economic and mnemonic decisions may function through similar 754 brain mechanisms. 755
The overlap between our proposed framework and the framework used for 756 perceptual decisions is not limited to its relationship with memory-guided decisions. The 757 attentionally aligned coding scheme we propose is shared with perceptual systems. For 758 example, neurons in the ventral visual system have large receptive fields that often 759 contain multiple stimuli competing for attention. Focusing attention on a particular 760 stimulus causes the neurons to behave as if the attended option were the only one present. 761
Thus, the identity of the attended option is identified only by the status of attention. 762
When attention shifts (within the receptive field), the tuning stays the same but the 763 response changes to one that is based on the newly attended stimulus. 764
This principle, known as biased competition, has proven successful at explaining 765 responses of neurons in the ventral visual stream and offers a basis for theorizing about 766 memory, attention, and learning (Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Moran and Desimone, 767 1985; Chelazzi et al., 1998) . Our framework is, in essence, an extension of these ideas 768 past the temporal pole, along the uncinate fasciculus, and into the orbital and medial 769 regions of the prefrontal cortex. We are not the first to make this analogy. From the motor 770 1 side, Cisek and colleagues have argued that biased competition principles also apply to 771 representation and choice signals in motor and premotor regions (Cisek 2007; Cisek and 772 Kalaska, 2010; Pastor-Bernier and Cisek, 2011). We agree with this idea and propose that 773 it extends backwards. One appealing feature of this idea is that it allows the brain to make 774 use of a single principle to make both perceptual and economic decisions, rather that use 775 a completely different architecture for the two types of choices. 776
777
The neuroeconomic binding problems. One virtue of our framework is that it 778 offers a solution to three important neuroeconomic binding problems that are difficult to 779 avoid with labeled-line models. They concern how values are bound to options, to Padoa-Schioppa, 2014). Finally, once the choice is resolved, we need to link the 786 experienced value with the choice that produced it (the outcome binding problem). This is 787 one example of the broader class known as credit assignment problems (Sutton and 788 Barto, 1998; Schultz, 2006) . 789
These binding problems can be understood by analogy to the feature binding 790 problem (Treisman and Gelade, 1980; Shadlen and Movshon, 1999; Engel and Singer, 791 2001 ). Imagine seeing a red square and a blue circle; how does your brain know that it is 792 not seeing a red circle and a blue square? Neuronal activity encoding each option 793 dimension must be somehow coordinated. This coordination is unlikely to come through 794 specialized neurons that are sensitive to any combination of multiple features -this 795 would lead to a problem of a combinatorial explosion (Von der Malsburg, 1981; Shadlen 796 and Movshon, 1999; Plaut and McClelland, 2010) . One possibility is that this problem is 797 solved by the degeneracy introduced by attention: if only one option is attended at a time, 798 then the dimensions can be assumed to be related to the same single object. The same 799 principle may apply for value as well. 800
2
These binding problems are difficult to solve in a labeled-line system. If line 801 labels are stable, our brains would need neurons for all possible options; this is 802 unrealistic. If a new option is added to the mix, new neurons would have to be added. 803
Would they be kept in reserve just in case a new option appears? What if ten new options 804 appear at once? This approach would require complex and specific wiring, ready to go 805 for any possible choice. If the labels are assigned dynamically, then in situations with 806 dozens of choices -such as when choosing cereals at the grocery store -we would need 807 competition between dozens of neuron types. This approach would also require an as yet 808
unidentified supervisory system to assign labels and implement the assignment. More 809 importantly, it would not solve the binding problem: how would the decoders know 810 which options had been assigned to which neurons? How could they know which action 811 to perform to select the option? The costs of such coordination are daunting. 812
In our model, option identity and value / action / choice can be decoded by the 813 principle of degeneracy: if there are only one option, value, and action within the focus of 814 attention, then they can be assumed to correspond. Thus, in our framework, binding is 815 implemented by attention, and is determined solely by temporal context, not by stable 816 A stopping decision has some conceptual similarities with an accept-reject 829 decision. Both involve a decision about whether to pursue a single action plan or to 830 refrain from it. Neither involves direct comparison of action plans. In a serial choice 831 3 3 model, each option is either pursued (accepted) or ignored (rejected). For this reason, 832 serial choice can be likened to as a pair of accept-reject decisions (Kacelnik et al., 2011) . 833
We could equally call each accept-rejection decision a stopping decision: accept is go and 834 reject is stop (or withhold from accepting the option). This change in terminology would 835 raise the possibility that economic decisions are, at least in some cases, implemented in 836 fundamentally the same way as stopping decisions. 837
The benefit of this interpretation is that we already know a great deal about the 838 neuroscience, the pharmacology, the psychology, and even the psychiatry of stopping. It 839 would be extremely powerful if we could import these ideas wholesale into the field of 840 neuroeconomics, and thus gain a good deal of insight in one fell swoop. Thus, for 841 example, the roles of several cortical and subcortical structures are relatively well-known 842 in stopping; if we could predict and test their corresponding roles in economic choice, 843 that would lead to rapid advance in our understanding of choice. For example, the dACC 844 is part of both the canonical economic and the canonical stopping circuitry (Heilbronner 845 and . Are these two roles entirely distinct, or are they aspects of a single 846 function? If we can conceptually unify economics and stopping, then we can more 847 adequately answer this question and others like it. 
